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The question of whether workers take part of the rents when a firm introduces 
technological changes is studied. Information from a Spanish survey, the Encuesta 
sobre Estrategias Empresariales covering a period of five years, 1990-1994 is used. 
I Given the data available, panel data techniques are used to control unobserved 
I heterogeneity. A new estimation method proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
has also been used to improve efficiency results. The results provide confirmation 
that innovations may be a good approximation to economic rents. In fact, firms 
, which carry out process and product innovations jointly pay larger wages. More-
over, there exists evidence that process innovations and process and product innova-
tions jointly are determined with wages. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The effect of technological change upon earnings has 
become an interesting issue to which several microecono-
metric studies have paid attention lately.! In general, a 
positive relationship between wages and innovations has 
been found in the literature because innovation is associ-
ated with higher productivity due to greater effort, comple-
mentarities with human capital, or upgrading of labour 
quality. The consideration of these factors leads to the 
study of the wages and technical activity correlation from 
a competitive point of view (Dickens and Katz, 1987; 
Krueger, 1993). 
Recently, an alternative view has arisen consisting in that 
wages are being partly determined by sharing the quasi-
rents. However, the decision about a desirable measure of 
the source of rents is an important question to take into 
account. Many economists have pointed out as source of 
these returns the existence of efficiency wages in the labour 
market (Krueger and Summers (1988) for the USA, Andres 
and Garcia (1991) or Jaumandreu and Martinez-Ros 
(1995) for Spain). Others emphasize firm's size considera-
tions (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Christofides and Oswald 
(1992) relate the extra-returns to the per capita profitability 
and Stewart (1990) to the number of rivals that the firm 
faces. 
Although a large list of variables relating to the source of 
rents could be stated, another possibility is to consider that 
rents could be generated by technological innovations (Van 
Reenen, 1994). The conceptual framework could be estab-
lished as follows. Innovative returns are the reward for the 
first commercialization of an invention and lead to a firm 
prosperity and a large surplus to be divided among 
employer and workers. If the bargaining between the 
labour market agents obtain the share in those innovation 
returns, then it should devote in an increase in the level of 
pay (Van Reenen, 1993). 
The main purpose of this work is to look at the change in 
the real wage paid by firms when they are engaged in inno-
vation activity and make comparisons with those who do 
not engage in this activity. The focus is on the idea that 
technical change can produce some additional profits 
within the firm. As a result, workers attempt to share 
these extra-rents by capturing wage increases. Moreover, 
two alternative measures of rents are employed to carry out 
this study. The firm specific technical changes are taken 
distinguishing between process and product innovation. 
This distinction is important because it corresponds to 
1 See, for example, Bound and lohnson (1992) or Bartel and Lichtenberg (1990). 
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two different outputs of technical change which cause dif-
ferent effects over wages since its determination does not 
follow the same process (Lunn, 1986). 
Individual data for Spanish manufacturing firms during 
the 1990-1994 period are used. The study is set in a 
dynamic framework and the nature of the data requires 
the use of panel data techniques. In this specification 
least squares estimates may not be consistent because of 
the potential presence of unobservable effects which are 
correlated with the lagged real wage. Hence, it is necessary 
to use alternative methods to overcome this problem. The 
procedures utilized (Instrumental Variables (IV) or 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)) are based on 
the ideas of Anderson and Hsiao (AH, hereafter) (1982) or 
Arellano and Bond (AB) (1991). Alternatively, a new IV 
method proposed by Arellano and Bover (ABv) (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (BB) (1995) is implemented which 
improves efficiency. The use of this last method is needed 
by the short time dimension of the data. 
The rest of the study contains four sections. In Section Il 
a reference framework is exposed. Section III describes the 
main features of the data. Section IV presents the econo-
metric treatment of the model and the variables used. 
Results are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes 
the paper. 
11. FRAMEWORK 
Technological change is frequently analysed from two 
opposite points of view. First, the positive one, considers 
it as a gain in living standards made possible by new tech-
nologies. The second point, the negative one, sees the inno-
vation as a threat for some workers who may lose their 
jobs. The former relies on the idea that innovation rents 
are the payment for the effort in the introduction of an 
invention by the firm. Hence, rents could be divided 
between the employer and the employees. The latter 
focuses on the effect of innovations on labour demand. 
In this paper, the approach followed is based on rent shar-
ing explanations. The hypothesis of this theory consists in 
that efficient companies are more able to share the quasi 
rents amongst the employees. As a result they enjoy higher 
wages than those fixed by the labour market and its human 
capital endowments. At least, three reasons sustain that 
workers can appropriate a portion of the rents: (i) the 
long lag of the innovation activity results; (ii) the different 
horizon of workers' rents with respect the employer and 
(iii) the hazard elements in the innovative success, which 
benefit more to workers because they do not suffer the costs 
of technical activity. 
The wage setting follows the insider-outsider approach 
where incumbent workers are protected by labour turnover 
costs and by some specific skills which are necessary in the 
production process (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988, or 
Dolado and Bentolila, 1992). Insiders have an interest to 
maximize rents extracted from the wage bargain with 
employers. The determination of wages will depend on 
inside factors (bargaining power and firm's activity) and 
the alternative income of outside elements. Under such 
conditions firms may improve its performance by intro-
ducing some kind of technological advance in order to 
increase profits. It leads to incumbent employees to capture 
some of these extra rents. 
In this context, a useful starting point is the standard 
wage equation (Layard et al., 1991). This framework con-
siders that wage determination comes from a bargaining 
process between the union and the firm in which wages 
are explained by the alternative wage workers would face 
outside the firm (w), the bargaining power of the union (s), 
and other conditions (X). 
As explained before, one way to raise economic rents of 
workers is through the introduction of some technical 
change by the firm. One could assume that innovations 
are among the X's, and they may capture this effect. 
Hence, it is expected that innovations will have a positive 
sign because the product quality improvement (either 
changing the production process and/or creating new prod-
ucts) shifts the labour demand and this leads to higher 
wages. Since the interest is in verifying the positive impact 
of innovations on wages, such variable should be isolated 
from the other conditions. Then the wage determination 
can be expressed as: 
w=w(w,s,I,X) (1) 
where I is a measure of technological activity. 
The positive influence of innovations is justified because 
a firm which decides to innovate may consider the new 
technological change as a good instrument to increase its 
profits. Innovation rents are understood as the reward for 
the first commercialization of an invention and they take 
place before technical diffusion does. When a firm adopts a 
new technology through diffusion it is unlikely to generate 
substantial rents as it will have to pay a price to purchase 
the new techniques. The price to pay for innovation may 
simply be lower research and development spending and 
one would expect far sighted insiders to reduce their 
appropriation of the technological fruits of research. The 
rent-sharing issue focuses on innovation rather than diffu-
sion and positively relates wages with technical change in 
the empirical work. 
Ill. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data base used in this study contains firm level infor-
mation for the Spanish manufacturing industry from the 
Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE) and cov-
ers the period 1990-1994. The ESEE is a survey conducted 
by the Ministry of Industry and Energy across approxi-
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mately 2000 manufacturing companies. One of the advan-
tages of utilizing this data is the detailed information on 
innovations and firm's characteristics. The relevant vari-
ables for the study are briefly described in the next section. 
The survey is a panel with a different number of firms 
each year but keeping 2188 firms which are followed over 
time. The sample selection consists of excluding observa-
tions with missing values due to problems of data consis-
tency.2 We also delete observations for firms which do not 
report information in any of the three years. Thus, the final 
sample is a balanced panel with 1306 observations avail-
able for each period. This reduced sample is a good repre-
sentation of the manufacturing industry after comparing 
the descriptive statistics with those of the complete sample 
(2188 firms). The observation across this sample leads to 
classify firms into two wide groups: approximately 65% are 
small and medium firms (less than 200 workers) and 35% 
are large firms (more than 200 workers).3 
In general, the Spanish industry was not characterized by 
much innovative activity but the integration into the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, induced 
firms, in many cases, to change their strategic behaviour. In 
fact, 45% of firms in 1992 have introduced some kind of 
innovation compared with figures of around 15% in 1986 
taken from the Central de Balances survey of the Bank of 
Spain.4 Traditionally, the Spanish industry is mainly com-
posed of small-medium firms with a low percentage of 
innovation activity but during the 1980s companies have 
developed some technical change, mainly in process inno-
vation, which might have affected the composition of their 
labour force as well as their internal capability to face the 
competitors. It can be argued that entry into the EEC has 
entailed companies to be more competitive and to try to 
gain market share both in the internal and foreign markets. 
However, a common problem of the technical activity is 
its measurement. So far, the empirical studies have tried to 
find good proxies of the source of innovation rents using 
R&D expenditure, patents, etc. Sometimes, these measures 
are not well reported in data sets and may cause misinter-
pretation of the results (Griliches 1990). In this work, the 
use of two different measures is proposed: process and 
product innovations. This provides a new alternative meas-
ure compared with other studies, since a more accurate 
information of technological change is exploited. 5 One is 
able to measure the output of innovation activity which 
generates quite different estimates of the size of spillovers 
than innovative input do. Moreover, the separation of 
these technical variables captures the two relevant aspects 
Table 1. Pure correlation between wages and innovations 
Wages 
Product 
Process 
Both 
Wages 
1 
0.0062 
0.0880 
0.1662 
Product 
1 
-0.1409 
-0.1421 
Process 
1 
-0.1919 
Both 
giving the firm a better advantage: first, if a innovative 
product occurs, then it affects favourably the firm's market 
position; second, with the new process, the internal cap-
ability of the firm is transformed since it is more efficient 
and flexible (Geroski et aI., 1993). 
Both activities are considered outputs of the production 
process in contrast to the works of Van Reenen (1994) and 
Geroski et al. (1993) that consider the input of technical 
change, i.e. R&D expenditures. The use of an output vari-
able leads one to know what effort has been developed by 
the firm and how it has been translated in more rents. In 
addition, the use of different types of innovation adds more 
and better information than other indicators (patents, for 
instance) because not all technical change transforms in a 
patent and because one would not be able to distinguish 
different behaviours as a result of the introduction of some 
innovation. 
A brief exploration of the data reports that 16% of firms 
do both product and process innovation, 9% innovate only 
in new products and 16% only in new processes. However, 
the behaviour of both types of activity has been different. 
Product innovation has experienced an increase during the 
period reaching an 11 % participation in the last year. In 
contrast, process innovation grew faster up to 1992 and 
stopped practically increasing in 1994. The indicator that 
firms engage jointly produce and process innovations pro-
vides evidence that this activity increased until 1994. After 
then, it shows a slightly decline. The explanation of this 
fact can be that the recession in Spain has had more influ-
ence in product than in process innovation. It is what we 
expect if we think that the process view may be associated 
with permanent effects on the profitability of the firm while 
the product view only produces transitory effects. 
In order to appraise the link between innovation activity 
and wages a correlation matrix is presented in Table 1. A 
priori, process innovation seems to have more influence on 
wages than the creation of new products. But if both activ-
ities are simultaneously done the effect doubles the process 
2 Those firms which report zero sales and/or zero employment have been dropped. 
3 For an extensive description of this survey see Segura et al. (1992). A more complete explanation of the data used in this analysis is 
available from the author on request. 
4 See Labeaga and Martinez-Ros (1994). 
5 ~ickens and Katz (1987) and Bartel and Lichtenberg (1990) use industry research and development whereas Nickell et al. (1992) try 
With Solow residuals. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Innovating only in product Innovating only in process Innovating in product and process 
Number of Observations 617 1044 1059 
(a) 
WAGE 1.056 (0.443) 1.140 (0.412) 1.1 03 (0.455) 
SKILLED 0.035 (0.060) 0.033 (0.053) 0.046 (0.067) 
SEMI-SKILLED 0.053 (0.072) 0.045 (0.056) 0.058 (0.062) 
UNSKILLED 0.918 (0.101) 0.925 (0.082) 0.899 (0.099) 
CHEM. AND MET. 0.263 (0.440) 0.316 (0.465) 0.272 (0.445) 
MECHANICAL 0.254 (0.436) 0.227 (0.419) 0.339 (0.476) 
FOOD AND DRINK 0.128 (0.334) 0.138 (0.345) 0.144 (0.352) 
WOODEN 0.355 (0.479) 0.319 (0.466) 0.245 (0.430) 
(b) 
1990 0.066 (0.248) 0.065 (0.247) 0.129 (0.336) 
1991 0.090 (0.287) 0.193 (0.395) 0.180 (0.384) 
1992 0.1 06 (0.309) 0.183 (0.387) 0.168 (0.374) 
1993 0.104 (0.306) 0.178 (0.382) 0.160 (0.367) 
1994 0.1 06 (0.308) 0.181 (0.385) 0.173 (0.378) 
SMALL 0.096 (0.295) 0.135 (0.342) 0.099 (0.298) 
LARGE 0.091 (0.288) 0.205 (0.404) 0.278 (0.448) 
CENTREa 0.091 (0.288) 0.149 (0.356) 0.145 (0.352) 
SOUTH 0.071 (0.258) 0.148 (0.355) 0.120 (0.326) 
NORTH 0.084 (0.278) 0.184 (0.388) 0.166 (0.372) 
MEDITER 0.106 (0.308) 0.158 (0.365) 0.179 (0.383) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
a Regions are aggregated in four categories. Centre: Aragan, C. la Mancha, C. and Lean and Madrid. South: Andalucia, Extremadura 
and Canarias. North: Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, Pais Vasco, Rioja and Navarra. Mediter: Catalufia, Valencia, Murcia and Baleares. 
activity. It could indicate the importance of considering the 
three technical activities separately. 
Tables 2a and 2b summarize the main findings obtained 
from comparing firms which innovate in a different way. 
Firms seem to pay their employees better when the innova-
tion process is carried out. It could be feasible to think that 
the adoption of a new process improves the cost structure 
and also the efficiency, which confirms the rent-sharing 
hypothesis. But following this reasoning we expect that 
process innovating firms would use more skilled workers. 
The evidence of the sample rejects this because the presence 
of skilled employees are similar in the two groups of inno-
vating firms. However, when both technical activities are 
undertaken simultaneously, the share of skilled workers 
increases significantly. Industry variables show that 
Leather is the most innovative in product and Chemical 
and Leather the most innovative in process. The 
Mechanical sector appears as the most dynamic in the 
introduction of innovations jointly, the likely reason 
being that it takes advantage of all the changes produced 
in computers, vehicles, etc. 
Another interesting result of the statistics is the innova-
tion by firm size. We observe that the innovation pattern is 
similar in both categories of firm who carry out more inno-
vations in process although in different magnitude as 
expected. Small-medium firms innovate by 14% in process 
while large firms do so at 20%. The difference is in the 
innovations simultaneously, large firms are more prevalent 
when both activities are done jointly (28 %). It confirms the 
known hypothesis due to Schumpeter that large firms are 
more capable to appropriate the rents of a technical 
change. 
IV. SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC 
TREATMENT 
The theoretical equation implies an empirical specification 
of the model with the following structural form, which in 
the case that innovations are exogenous is equivalent to the 
reduced form: 
Wit = a Wit-l + j3'INOVit + ,,('Sw + 8'Xi! + Tt + fit (2) 
where W is the wage of firm i in period t (in natural logs), 
INO V is a matrix containing innovation variables, S repre-
sents the skill composition of the labour force within the 
firm at the beginning of the period. The X matrix contains 
other shifters, as an alternative to wages or a measure of 
firm market position. T are time effects considered as addi-
tional parameters to be estimated and fit is a random term 
composed of heterogeneous effects, JL;, and a standard 
mixed error term, Vi!. Finally, the introduction of lagged 
wages controls the dynamics in the process of wage deter-
mination. An important remark is due here: in this speci-
fication the bargaining power is assumed as a parameter 
which is maximized outside of our study. In Spain, this 
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feature is possible since unions do not represent most of the 
workers but only those who are members; in fact, union 
members are the insiders who have the bargaining power in 
the firm, so the pressure of outsiders is not considered. 
The dependent variable, W, is the firm average wages 
expressed in logarithms. With respect to the INO V matrix, 
the possibility to distinguish process from product innova-
tions allows us to determine which kind of activity contri-
butes to obtaining larger quasirents by workers. Therefore, 
the availability of information about which innovation 
activity is undertaken by the firm, allows the construction 
of several alternatives measures. Three variables have been 
employed: PRODUCT, which takes the value of one when 
the firm answer affirmatively the question of whether or not 
it carries out only the development of a new product, and 
zero otherwise; PROCESS the same as product but only 
considering the inclusion of a new process, and the same 
for the variable BOTHINOV when firm engages in both 
innovations at the same time. With these measures we con-
trol for the real innovations since in some cases companies 
do not report correctly the kind of technical change which 
are introducing. 
In the specification, we also consider variables related to 
skilled employees as a mechanism to control the labour 
supply heterogeneity. Thus, we construct three variables 
measuring the level of qualification defined as the propor-
tion of engineers and degree workers in the firm 
(SKILLED), the proportion of intermediate skilled work-
ers (with a lower degree) (SEMISKILLED) and the pro-
portion of non-degree workers (NODEG).6 Descriptive 
statistics of employment reveals a constant structure 
along the period. 
Along with this group we introduce the industry wage as 
a measure of alternative wage (A VG WAGE) and a relative 
measure of size - the market share (SHARE). The macro-
economic shocks are controlled by time dummies (DTt, 
t = 90, ... ,94). As an additional control, we have consid-
ered the mark-up variable (MARK-UP) as a measure of a 
firm's profitability. Finally, we have tried to introduce 
industry dummies to control some external factors which 
could modify the firm strategy. 7 
An important feature of the panel data is the ability to 
control unobserved heterogeneous effects (as regards firms 
in our model). If we consider that JLi is not observable, the 
presence of the lagged variable introduces correlation 
among these effects and the regressors. Hence, OLS or 
Within Groups (WG) estimates are no longer consistent 
(Nickell, 1981). In order to take into account the correla-
tion amongst the lagged wage and the effects, there are 
several possibilities. One is to take first differences in the 
relevant equation and remove the effects (see AH or AB). 
The problem is that data are available only for five periods. 
This transformation and the need to instrument wages in 
the equation in differences do not recommend the use of 
this method. 
Recently, ABv and BB have proposed a new procedure. 
Under the assumption that the error term in Equation 2 is 
not serially correlated, the procedure could be instrumen-
ted by using the lagged wage growth (a variable which does 
not contain the effects) in the levels equation. This 
approach consists of exploiting the initial conditions infor-
mation for deriving optimal estimators in dynamic panel 
data models. This is important given the short dimension 
of the panel because, at the same time, the above problem 
of correlation is avoided and the efficiency of the estimators 
is improved (see ABv). 
On the other hand, if it is considered that technical 
change is not exogenous because of the possible influence 
of wages on innovations, then there is a need to instrument 
them as well. Past innovations could be used for this pur-
pose. This is not unreasonable if it is taken into account 
that a firm which innovates in the past is more likely to 
innovate in the future through learning process. Blundell 
et al. (1995) also confirm the idea of past innovations deter-
mining current innovations in the context of a count data 
model. 
V. MAIN FINDINGS 
In this section some factors are explored that might cause 
changes on real wages. The first estimation using as instru-
ment .6. Wit- l revealed the existence of first order serial 
correlation (ml = 10.37). As it could be induced by mis-
specification, the first attempt is to include Wit- 2 in the 
equation. Although the value of the first order serial cor-
relation test (ml = 6.67) can be reduced the null is rejected 
as well. Moreover, Wit- 2 (which is instrumented by 
.6. Wit- 2) is not significant. The presence of autocorrelated 
errors in the levels equation implies the use of alternative 
instruments. Following the ABv idea, all models in Table 3 
are estimated in levels using the second lag of the wage 
growth as instrument for wages. This is a valid instrument 
under the presence of first order serial correlation but in the 
absence of serial correlation of second order in the resi-
duals (m2 = -0.444). 
The availability of specific information about innova-
tions allows one to determine which kind of innovation 
6 There is only information of skills variables for 1990 and for 1994. Under this fact, it is assumed that the employment structure during 
the first four years do not change. The reference category is NODEG. 
7 There are 18 industry dummies available in the sample, but these have been aggregated into four: Chemicals and metal products; 
Electrical products, agricultural-industry machinery and motor vehicles; Food, drink and tobacco; and Leather, wooden and paper 
products. (Chemicals and metals products were chosen as the base industry.) 
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Table 3. Wages and innovations 
Innovations 
Innovations Endogenousab 
Exogenous 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
WAGEt_1 0.597 0.598 0.598 0.571 
0.223 0.222 0.212 0.208 
PRODUCT 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.029 
0.017 0.039 0.020 0.021 
PROCESS 0.054 0.061 0.027 0.029 
0.024 0.054 0.042 0.040 
BOTH 0.074 0.116 0.069 0.076 
0.034 0.059 0.037 0.038 
SKILLED 1.129 1.103 0.748 0.807 
0.562 0.548 0.370 0.384 
SEMISKILLED 0.253 0.232 0.183 0.l85 
0.159 0.150 0.122 0.127 
A VG WAGE 0.361 0.373 
0.155 0.151 
SHARE 0.017 0.018 
0.009 O.OlO 
MARK-UP -0.019 
0.041 
ml -0.806 -0.898 -0.513 0.140 
Sargan Test (3)C 3.lO 2.78 2.03 1.53 
No. observations 2612 2612 2612 2406 
Notes: a Innovations instrumented by It-I' b Columns 3 and 4 only consider process and both innovations 
as endogenous. C Additional instruments for the Sargan test are lagged innovations. Degrees of freedom 
in parentheses. All standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. Lagged wage instrumented by 
~Wit-2' All specifications include time and sectoral dummies. 
really affects pay. In general, process innovations cause a 
bigger and more significant effect on wages than product 
innovation, perhaps because product innovation might not 
require increased skill whereas process innovation could. 
The inclusion of a third innovation variable - BOTH -
denotes some positive influence. It seems that undertaking 
both activities simultaneously produce wage increases. One 
could ask whether product, process or both innovations 
have different coefficients on wages. After testing it is con-
cluded that the null is rejected in two cases: when one tests 
that innovation in product is equal to innovation in both 
activities (at 20% significance level), and when one tests 
that innovation in product is equal to innovation in both 
(at 10% significance level); in the other case. The null could 
not be rejected as expected since coefficients of PRODUCT 
and PROCESS are similar. Finally, the three technical 
variables are jointly significant as the Wald test (10.15) 
shows. 
Following the idea that the decisions about innovation in 
the past have influenced the current wage, a set of lagged 
innovation variables have been included. The introduction 
of these variables does not change the rest of the coeffi-
cients and does not affect the innovation controls either. 
Moreover, they are not individually and jointly significant 
(Wald test = 2.15). The reason could be that the technical 
activity measure in this study is the output of innovation. 
So, it would not be reasonable to introduce lags of output 
variables in the determination of an output innovation 
function since a new process or a new product tomorrow 
should not affect the current decision about technological 
innovation. 
On one hand, the value of the lagged wage coefficient, 
which in this context summarizes all past information, 
remains unchanged. This result, although minor, 
deserves some attention because it affects the long run 
effect of all right-hand-side variables. It means that past 
firm experience significantly affects the current wage 
determination. The influence is in the same direction and 
constant along this sample period. On the other hand, 
labour supply variables such as the worker's qualification 
has the expected sign. Skilled workers have a more import-
ant role in wage decisions than semiskilled workers and 
both categories have larger effects than non-degree 
workers.s 
8 This argument is sustainable in two ways. First, it can be seen in the sample that the employment structure does not change in the 
period. Second, in three Encuesta de Poblacion Activa is revealed the same employment pattern. Other variables (age, tenure or gender) 
which could affect the payment are not available. It has been checked, however, that they do not change along the sample period. 
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Finally, if the evolution of wage is observed a large 
increase (approximately 26%) of the wage is found during 
this period. One observes in the figures of average wages a 
high growth in 1992 (11 %) with an inflexion from there 
until the end of the time span. Looking at this behaviour it 
seems necessary to include time variables to control the 
business cycle. 
Up to now, the innovation variables have been restricted 
to be exogenous in estimating the above specification. 
From now on this assumption is relaxed and they are 
included. The main results for the levels equation are 
summarized in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3. The first 
column duplicates the earlier analysis taking now all 
innovations as endogenous while columns 3 and 4 
consider product innovation exogenous because the 
coefficient does not change when moving from (1) to (2). 
This seems reasonable since product innovation seems 
to have associated a short time effect in contrast to 
process innovation which requires a larger term in the 
production of technical activities. Clearly, the effect of 
innovations changes when lagged innovations are used as 
instruments.9 It is observed that product innovation con-
tinues to be not significant but the coefficient of the process 
innovation variable (which records those firms which carry 
out this activity only) has increased although, as expected, 
the standard error is a bit larger. The BOTH technical 
activity provides evidence that firms which engage in 
doing simultaneously both activities are those who really 
affect workers' pay. Notice that the innovations coefficients 
in these columns of the table change a lot compared to the 
first two columns. The likely reason is the endogeneity 
problem which has been solved after instrumenting. lO To 
test the exogeneity of the three innovation variables we 
perform variable addition tests. We estimate Probit models 
separately and include the errors in the specifications. The 
t-ratio is an exogeneity test. Alternatively, we include 
jointly the errors of all Pro bits and conduct a X2 test. As 
the results between columns 1 and 2 suggest, product 
innovation is confirmed as an exogenous variable while 
the test (larger than 2) shows that process and both inno-
vations are endogenous variables. Finally, the Sargan tests 
confirm the validity of the instruments in each 
specification. 11 
The results for the rest of the coefficients seem to be 
robust to the estimation method and remain without 
variation. Specifically, the lagged wage is highly significant 
and presents the same magnitude in all specifications. It 
is also interesting to comment that the inclusion of the 
alternative wagel2 and the market share variables have 
an important role in the determination of pay and show 
a weak decrease of all coefficients. In fact, the decrease 
in PROCESS and BOTH might indicate that the labour 
market and firms' strategies discipline the production of 
some of these innovation activities. Since the interest is in 
the measure of the wage premium that firms pay to 
employees when innovation is introduced in the 
organization, it is obtained that only when firms innovate 
in process or innovate in both activities simultaneously will 
employees receive a premium (7% and 20%, respectively). 
This percentage could motivate workers to make more 
effort in firms that innovate in process, for instance, 
because they capture some extra payment. This feed-back 
effect has been checked and confirmed in Martinez-Ros 
and Salas (1999). 
Moreover, the market share variable is picking up the 
relative size of the firm, and so it is testing the Brown and 
Medoff (1989) hypothesis that small companies pay less 
wages than large ones. These results confirm that the het-
erogeneity amongst firms also induces a source of inter-
firm wage differentials. One could consider the possibility 
of finding these kinds of endogenous variables, however, 
after instrumenting them we notice that the coefficients of 
both variables do not change. To be sure that these last 
variables are not endogenous column 4 has been 
re-estimated, instrumenting them with their first lags. 
None of the coefficients have changed in this estimation. 
The last column includes a measure of firms' profits 
as determinant of wages. As this variable was only 
available for a smaller number of firms, results are reported 
with a sample of 1203 firms by year. The inclusion of this 
variable is due to the attempt of measuring which part of 
the technological rents is appropriated by the entrepreneur. 
It may be considered to be endogenous since wages and 
profits could be determined simultaneously. Hence, column 
4 provides results instrumenting the mark-up variables 
with its lags. It is observed that the coefficient is not sig-
nificant but its introduction in the estimated equation pro-
duces changes in the rest of coefficients. Specifically, 
product innovation improves its significance. It indicates 
that the product activity has a lighter role in the determi-
nation of wages when it is controlled by profitability. There 
has also been an attempt to disaggregate the mark-up in 
three intervals (from less to more profitable firms). In this 
case, the findings allow the inference that the higher the 
9 R&D expenditure in 1990 has been used as an additional instrument in this specification. However, these results are not presented 
because its introduction does not modify the coefficients. 
10 The fact that innovations could be endogeneous is also tested by Van Reenen (1994) without differentiating the kind of technical 
change. This study has also tried to use the predicted innovations as instruments without significant changes in the results. 
II All equations include lagged innovations as additional instruments. 
12 Results with regional dummies have been also tried but the main results do not change. Probably, the outside wage is captured by the 
industry wage and industry dummies as literature related to efficiency wage manifests. 
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mark-up for the firms, the smaller the rents derived of 
innovation that accrue to workers. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study has used the ESEE 1990-94 data to examine the 
effect of innovations on wages. Attention has been focused 
on alternative explanations of rent-sharing as opposed to 
the competitive one. Given the available data and having 
set up the model in a dynamic context, four methods have 
been used to take into account problems caused by the 
presence of unobservable effects which are correlated 
with the lagged wage. 
The main findings are summarized as follows. 
Innovations appear as a source of additional rents for the 
employees, as expected. It seems that process innovation 
has a different effect in the determination of the pay than 
product innovation because of its different determination. 
In fact, it was observed that when both activities under-
taken are dealt with simultaneously, the effect is three times 
larger than when activities are carried out separately. 
Employees only capture a wage premium when a firm 
introduces some new process or new products and new 
process simultaneously. Furthermore, the data show that 
product and process innovation are not associated at firm 
level. Firms that introduce product innovation do not 
necessarily carry out process innovation (and vice versa). 
In econometric terms, the use of the ABv proposal 
allows the estimation of a levels equation using instruments 
in differences which overcomes the problems of correlation 
among lagged dependent variables and the effects, and 
improve efficiency over previous methods. A final set of 
results are presented in which some innovations - process 
and both - are treated as endogenous. Hence, they confirm 
the simultaneous determination of both wages and innova-
tions being the innovation activity a good approximation 
to economic rents. 
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